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This paper will show that Mary Wollstonecraft developed a modern feminist version of virtue
ethics. Virtue ethics is an all-encompassing moral theory which holds that the best life for
individuals is commensurate with a good society. Simply, self-interest and our public duties
are argued as identical and not at odds when we realize what is truly good for ourselves and
for others. In the Western philosophic cannon, the most common version of virtue ethics
is Aristotle’s, with the Nicomachean Ethics as the definitive presentation. Wollstonecraft’s
argument for the political, social, economic, and personal equality of women utilizes ideas
that are reminiscent of classical virtue ethics. Her novel and effective addition is to show that
the explicit inclusion of women requires a reconsideration of the duties needed for happy lives
to be led and for a good society, and good families, to exist.
To show Wollstonecraft’s virtue ethics innovations as being fundamental for the produc-
tion of a good society this paper will proceed as follows. First will be a very brief and focused
review of Aristotle’s discussion of self-love. Next, an overview of Wollstonecraft’s reflections
on virtue, self-interest (self-love), good families, and a good society will be conducted. This
paper will conclude with an endorsement of a feminist virtue ethics as important in our current
age. This is especially the case given the continual failures of men and women to treat each
other as true friends and not as mere means.
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Aristotle on Self-Love
The Nicomachean Ethics can, at times, seem to be a narcissistic work with a focus on an in-
dividual’s happiness.1 This intuition is most obviously mediated by Aristotle’s discussion of
justice in Book V and his comments on the importance of education and politics that con-
cludes the work. Still, of greater importance is Aristotle’s discussion of friendship, which he
devotes the entirety of Books VIII and IX. His treatment of friendship extends beyond private
relationships between peers to encompass political friendship and friendship in families. Top-
ics of major importance are his comments on self-love, since this discussion brings together,
into a common end, individual advantage and social advantage.
In Book IX Aristotle provides a typology of the kinds of self-love, which are classified as
two: a bad kind and a good (or enlightened) kind. Self-love is usually understood as unde-
sirable for society because most find it to serve only our base desires. This is the bad kind of
self-love, as Aristotle explains:
Those who make self-love a matter for reproach ascribe it to those who award the
biggest share in money, honor, and bodily pleasures to themselves. For these are
the goods desired and eagerly pursued by the many on the assumption that they
are best. (Aristotle 1168b16)
In contradistinction, enlightened self-love is the bringing together of what is good for
others and what is good for ourselves, even if the objects that are enjoyed by either party are
different:
And when everyone strains to achieve what is fine and concentrates on the finest
actions, everything that is right will be done for the common good, and each
person individually will receive the greatest of goods, since that is the character
of virtue. And so the good person must be a self-lover, since he will both help
himself and benefit others by doing fine actions. (Aristotle 1169a10)
It is quite true that, as they say, the excellent person labors for his friends and for
his native country, and will die for them if he must; he will sacrifice money, hon-
ors, and contested goods in general, in achieving the fine for himself. (Aristotle
1169a20)
1I agree with an anonymous reviewer that the claim of Aristotle’s virtue ethics being perceived as narcissistic
needs to be substantiated. In short, a narcissistic reading is a mistake that one can fall into if the entirety of
Aristotle’s system is not considered, especially his discussion of self-love.
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When the virtuous person performs fine actions the public and her friends enjoy the phys-
ical results. At the same time, the virtuous person enjoys an even greater good for themselves,
a good act.
Wollstonecraft’s Virtue Theory
Wollstonecraft appears to have not been substantially influenced by Aristotle. She extensively
discussed the leading moral philosophers of her time: Smith, Hume, Kant, and, especially,
Rousseau. Nonetheless, her moral theory is unique and far-ranging for her age since she
establishes connections between moral action, self-interest, the best life, good families, and a
good society. Her moral theory achieves the same harmonious relationship between self and
society that Aristotle championed in his own work.2
Wollstonecraft provides a striking contrast between her ideal of virtue, acquired through
education, with the current model of her own time for the behavior and goals of women:
… I wish to persuade women to endeavor to acquire strength, both of mind and
body, and to convince them that the soft phrases, susceptibility of heart, delicacy
of sentiment, and refinement of taste, are almost synonymous with epithets of
weakness, …
Dismissing then those pretty feminine phrases, which men condescendingly use
to soften our slavish dependence, and despising that weak elegancy of mind,
exquisite sensibility, and sweet docility of manners, supposed to be the sexual
characteristics of that weaker vessel, I wish to shew that elegance is inferior to
virtue, that the first object of laudable ambition is to obtain a character as a human
being, regardless of the distinction of sex; … (Wollstonecraft 73)
Wollstonecraft’s contrast is rooted within the political aspirations of her time, where re-
publicanism is best for rational beings; and aristocracy, luxury, and elegance are anathema
to the usefulness of knowledge, work, and independence (Wollstonecraft 129). She appeals
to Enlightenment ideals to demonstrate that the current education of women, practically and
morally, is akin to aristocratic cultivation, which is contrary to desirable human attributes of
virtue of character and applied learning (Wollstonecraft 83 and 90). Aristocratic ideals prize
2In a comment, André Luiz Cruz Sousa helpfully pointed out that Aristotle’s notion of the human good, which
applies to individuals and the city (1094b7-10), has an important overlap with Wollstonecraft’s project. Also, Dirk
Schuck insightfully noted in his comments that there are Platonic elements in Wollstonecraft’s presentation based
on an ideal of friendship between the sexes.
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parasitical dependence on others, a stultification of understanding the organization and oper-
ation of the natural and social worlds, and kinds of pleasure seeking that sees other people
as mere mechanisms for satisfaction (Wollstonecraft 112-113). In contradistinction, Woll-
stonecraft prizes self-reliance, usefulness to one’s family and society, and a development of
character that treats people as friends and moral agents (Wollstonecraft 95, 118, and 130).
Similar to Aristotle, Wollstonecraft distinguishes between unreasonable and reasonable
forms of self-interest, which are structured around not only performance of service to family
and society, but also, moral friendship between women and men. She notes that men com-
monly seek to maintain the subordinate position of women in society since they view them as
devices for the attainment of pleasure. The same as despots fostering ignorance to maintain
servile subjects:
… as blind obedience is ever sought for by power, tyrants and sensualists are in
the right when they endeavor to keep women in the dark, because the former only
want slaves, and the later a play-thing. (Wollstonecraft 90)
In addition, such conditions create the social and political conditions for the subordination
of women. It is rational to cultivate superficial, self-interested, and manipulative abilities
to secure modicums of economic security when one’s legal position is akin to children and
animals:
Before marriage it is their business to please men; and after, with a few exceptions,
they follow the same scent with all the preserving pertinacity of instinct. …
Is it then surprising that when the sole ambition of women centers in beauty, and
interest gives vanity additional force, perpetual rivalships should ensue? …
… I shall immediately agree that it is woman’s duty to cultivate a fondness for
dress, in order to please, and a propensity to cunning for her own preservation.
(Wollstonecraft 276)
Such conditions of domination and subordination, dependence and insecurity fosters un-
civil and competitive interests. Thus, it is unsurprising that injustice is perpetuated given the
imperative of self-preservation:
Women, it is true, obtaining power by unjust means, by practicing or fostering
vice, evidently lose the rank which reasons would assign them, and they become
either abject slaves or capricious tyrants. (Wollstonecraft 113)
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Wollstonecraft’s solution to such ills is two-fold. First, there is the establishment of the
economic independence of women through useful education and the obtaining of political
representation in government (Wollstonecraft 227-230).3 Second, women and men should
cultivate moral friendship towards themselves and each other (Wollstonecraft 68 and 95-96).4
Men and women must see each other as moral and rational beings in order to overcome our
tyrannical and exploitive history:
The two sexes mutually corrupt and improve each other. This I believe to be an
indisputable truth, extending it to every virtue. Chastity, modesty, public spirit,
and all the noble train of virtues, on which social virtue and happiness are built
should be understood and cultivated by all mankind, or they will be cultivated to
little effect. (Wollstonecraft 219)
Final Comments
Unfortunately, other aspects of Wollstonecraft’s moral philosophy cannot be touched on due
to space constraints. Nonetheless, the importance of the cultivation of virtue has been shown
not only as desirable in itself, but also as essential for friendship between women and men.
Her focus extends beyond the mistreatment, subjugation, forced ignorance, and exploitation
of women, important as these topics are to understand our selfish behaviors. Additionally,
Wollstonecraft identifies a moral failure to bring our institutions into alignment with virtu-
ous actions and intentions. A desire for moral outcomes will be subverted by the counter-
intentions of others and social structures that reinforce selfishness at the expense of the public
good. These institutions will prevent the desirable development of an individual’s capacities.
This is important for our own time, since we are realizing that legal reform is insufficient
when individuals lack virtue. In closing, we should ask ourselves a question that, I find, Woll-
stonecraft perpetually asked in her books and novels: Do we seek the good for others, or only
the good for ourselves; and if we choose the latter, at what expense?
3In reference to Wollstonecraft’s criticism of empty elegance, André Luiz Cruz Sousa noted that there are
parallels with Aristotle’s advocacy of virtue and his criticism of a life of honor. This observation also has clear
application to Wollstonecraft’s chapter on reputation.
4Emma Cohen de Laura suggested that Rousseau’s work had an influence on Wollstonecraft’s conception of
friendship. This is an intriguing point that merits further study given Wollstonecraft’s complex engagement with
Rousseau’s philosophy.
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